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YC Applications · 9 min read

They named the regulators as their biggest fear. They were right, for the wrong reason.

Asked who they feared, the application skips every competitor it has listed and names the regulators. Two years later Standard Treasury could not raise a Series A, on regulatory and geographic risk. Right threat, wrong delivery mechanism — and the mechanism is what decides whether you continue.

By Shreyans Bhansali · August 22, 2026
Makersfuel — YC Applications, The Originals — Standard Treasury, YC S13, acquired by SVB 2015

Most YC applications answer the competition question with a moat. This one lists Square, Stripe, Braintree, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, Bloomberg, Intuit and PayPal — then throws the whole list away:

"So, who do I fear most? I fear regulators the most. Banks can't beat us on technology but we might be so successful they beat us with the law."

The application speaks in an unnamed "I". Internal evidence points hard at Zac Townsend — he is the one "still at Stripe", the one who worked in Newark, the one who went to Brown — but nothing labels it, so read the quotes as the application's voice rather than a signed statement.

At filing there was no demo, because "mocking up a fake API for you doesn't seem worth it." No product either, and both founders who wrote it were still employed elsewhere: Townsend at Stripe, Dan Kimerling at Giftly. They had a verbal agreement from Wells Fargo and were "pretty far along" with JPMorgan and Capital One — a verbal agreement and two live conversations, not contracts. They sized the market in big-O notation.

They got in. YC Summer 2013.

The sentence came true sideways

Regulators never beat Standard Treasury with the law. The company never got large enough to be worth beating.

What happened instead is that Standard Treasury decided to build its own bank — and then, in a post the two founders wrote together, "primarily because of concerns around regulatory and geographic risks, we were unable to raise a Series A funding round against that goal."

So the risk that ended it was regulatory, at least in part. The application had named regulatory risk. But the mismatch is the lesson: the application feared a successful company being attacked by the state, and what arrived was investors declining to fund a charter attempt the founders had chosen to make. A risk they walked into, not one aimed at them. Right category, wrong mechanism — and the mechanism decides whether you get to keep going.

Where they are now

In August 2015, Silicon Valley Bank acquired Standard Treasury's assets and team; terms were never disclosed. Kimerling joined SVB in July 2015, weeks before the deal was announced, and ran API Banking, Open Platform, and Global Research and Development. The company had already picked up American Banker's "Ten Technology Companies to Watch" and SWIFT's Global Innovator of the Year, and both founders made the 2015 Forbes 30 Under 30 list. Kimerling's own account credits backing from Y Combinator, Andreessen Horowitz and Index Ventures, on a seed reported at around $2.7M.

Townsend left within about a year; Kimerling within roughly two.

Dan Kimerling runs Deciens Capital as Founder and Managing Partner. Note what that is: the 2013 application lists deciens.com as the interesting thing the founders had built together — "We raised the money, we have made investments." The side project outlasted the startup. His portfolio includes Chipper, SimplyWise, and — read this slowly — Treasury Prime, a banking-as-a-service company selling API access to multiple bank partners, on whose board he sits. He was right about the idea. He gets paid for it now as an investor rather than a founder.

Zac Townsend became the inaugural Chief Data Officer of California, then went to McKinsey's financial services practice, and is now building a startup whose stated ambition is "the world's largest long-term insurer, using digital money."

And Silicon Valley Bank — the acquirer, the safe harbor, the sensible outcome for a startup that could not raise on regulatory risk — failed in March 2023, on a risk nobody was pricing in 2015.

What the application saw early

Read the product description with 2026 eyes:

"We will build commercial banking middleware that will sit on top of banks just like Twilio sits on top of multiple phone carriers."

That describes a category that did not exist yet. Treasury Prime (2017), Unit, Increase, Stripe Treasury — all of them are the sentence above, shipped by someone else, later. And the read on why banks would not do it themselves has not aged a day: "People who run banks don't care about providing high quality technology services, and the people who care about technology don't want to work with (or buy) a bank. Schlep blindness, as it were."

So this is not a thesis failure either. The regulatory risk arrived as a financing failure, and that distinction is why the application is worth reading. Standard Treasury's stated edge required scale in bank relationships before the product got good — its own answer says so: eight relationships is what buys "next-day payouts to 80% of checking accounts in the US," against competitors who "can only do next-day payouts on their one bank." That is a capital and compliance problem wearing a product roadmap, and the application says as much: "Raising money because of non-trivial commercial and regulatory costs."

Being early is indistinguishable from being wrong right up until it isn't — and by then the Series A window has closed and someone else is building your company with better timing and cheaper compliance infrastructure.

Read it knowing how it ends.